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Abstract
In the context of priority-based resource allocation, we formulate methods to
compare assignments in terms of their stability as binary relations (on the set of possible
assignments) that depend on the preference and the priority profile. We introduce three
basic properties, stability preferred, separability, and consistency, that a reasonable
stability comparison should satisfy. We show that, for any stability comparison satisfying
the three properties, the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism is minimally unstable
among efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching. An important
consequence is the robustness of a recent result by Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2019), which
uses a particular stability comparison method where an assignment is more stable than
another assignment if the set of blocking pairs in the former assignment is a subset of
the set of blocking pairs in the latter assignment. Our unifying approach covers basically
all natural comparison methods and it includes many cardinal stability comparison
methods as special cases.
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In many resource-allocation problems, each resource is endowed with an exogenously given
priority ordering over the participants, and a mechanism elicits participants’ preferences
and allocates resources based on the reported preferences and the exogenous priorities. A
well-known example is school choice where students report preference orderings over schools
and each school is endowed with a capacity and a priority ordering over students. In a
school choice problem, respecting preferences is captured by the efficiency requirement: an
assignment is efficient if there is no other assignment at which a student is better off while
no student is worse off. On the other hand, respecting priorities is captured by the stability
requirement: an assignment is stable if it does not involve a “blocking pair” of a student
and a school such that the student prefers the school to his assigned school and he has a
higher priority than another student who is assigned to that school. Unfortunately, there
exist school choice problems without an assignment that is both efficient and stable (Roth,
1982).
The seminal paper (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) introduces school choice and
proposes to use the students-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA) mechanism or the top trading
cycles (TTC) mechanism for real-life school choice problems. Both DA and TTC are strategy-
proof : for each student, it is a weakly dominant strategy to report his preferences truthfully
(and any (non-)sophisticated student’s best interest is to report his true preferences). DA is
stable but inefficient whereas TTC is efficient but unstable. However, DA is “constrained
efficient” as it chooses the students-optimal stable assignment. The TTC mechanism is
based on Gale’s TTC algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) and allows students to trade their
priorities among themselves starting with the students with highest priorities. A student
and a school may be involved in a blocking pair at a TTC assignment simply because a
lower priority student can be assigned a seat at that school by trading his high priority at
another school. When considering first stability and second efficiency, DA was suggested,
and considering first efficiency and second stability, TTC was suggested (Abdulkadiroğlu
and Sönmez, 2003). Although it is easy to see that TTC fails stability, intuitively it respects
priorities “to some extent” and should be, in some sense, “minimally unstable”.
The intuition for TTC has been only recently formalized by Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2019).
They propose to compare assignments in terms of their stability by comparing the sets of
blocking pairs at these assignments. An assignment is more stable than another assignment
if the set of blocking pairs in the former assignment is a subset of the set of blocking pairs in
the latter assignment. Using this stability comparison method, they show the following result:
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TTC is minimally unstable among efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one
matching (when each school has unit capacity), that is, for any other efficient and strategy-
proof mechanism, there exists an instance where the assignment chosen by this mechanism
does not produce a subset of blocking pairs of the TTC-assignment.
Although it does not extend to the many-to-one setup,1 the result of Abdulkadiroğlu et
al. (2019) is an important justification for using TTC in priority-based resource allocation
especially because their stability comparison method, which relies on comparing the sets
of blocking pairs (in the set inclusion sense), is very reasonable. However, there are other
plausible ways to compare assignments in terms of stability. A natural alternative is to
count the number of blocking pairs, which induces a complete comparison method (as all
assignments can be compared by counting blocking pairs) and it is not immediate from
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2019) whether TTC is minimally unstable among efficient and strategy-
proof mechanisms also based on this alternative cardinal comparison method. One may also
consider comparison methods that are not based on the set of blocking pairs, but based on
alternative sets such as (i) the set of blocking triplets2 as in Kwon and Shorrer (2019)3 or (ii)
the set of blocking students4 as in Doğan and Ehlers (2020).5 Possibly, TTC is minimally
unstable among efficient and strategyproof mechanisms for certain comparison methods but
not for others.
We show that the result of Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2019) is robust to the choice of stability
comparison method. We formulate stability comparisons as binary relations (on the set
of possible assignments) that depend on the preference profile. We introduce three basic
properties that any reasonable stability comparison should satisfy. The first property stability
preferred requires that any stable assignment is strictly more stable than any unstable
assignment. The second property separability requires that if an assignment is more stable
than another assignment, and at the same time some subset of students or their assigned
schools are not involved in any blocking pair at the first assignment and the second assignment
1For the many-to-one setup, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2019) show that TTC outperforms serial dictatorship,
an obvious efficient alternative, by admitting fewer blocking pairs in an average sense when every possible
priority profile is considered or when participants’ priorities are drawn uniform randomly.
2A blocking triplet includes, in addition to a blocking pair, a student who violates the priority of the
student in the blocking pair.
3Kwon and Shorrer (2019) show that TTC mechanism is minimally unstable among efficient and strategy-
proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching when stability comparison is based on comparing (in the set-inclusion
sense) sets of blocking triplets.
4A blocking student is a student who is involved in at least one blocking pair.
5In Doğan and Ehlers (2020), we show that there are school choice problems where any Pareto improvement
over the deferred acceptance assignment is not minimally unstable among efficient assignments when stability
comparison is cardinal and compares the number of blocking pairs, or when the stability comparison method
is based on comparing (in the set-inclusion or cardinal sense) sets of blocking students.
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assigns these students to the same schools while some of those students are involved in a
blocking pair, then the restriction of the first assignment to the remaining students and schools
is strictly more stable than the restriction of the second assignment. The third property
consistency requires that if two assignments coincide for some subset of students and these
students and their assigned schools are involved in blocking pairs only among themselves,
then the stability comparison remains identical when considering the assignments restricted
to the remaining students and schools. All of the above comparison methods satisfy all
three properties. We show that, given any stability comparison satisfying stability preferred,
separability and consistency, TTC is minimally unstable among efficient and strategy-proof
mechanisms when each school has unit capacity. Our main proof arguments are considerably
different than the corresponding ones of Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2019) or for characterizations
of TTC by Ma (1994) and Svensson (1999). Loosely speaking, we show that if our theorem is
not true, then we can always find a smaller problem (with fewer students) with a contradiction.
In particular, our approach handles cardinal comparison methods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces school choice problems and
mechanisms. Section 3 defines stability comparison methods and basic properties which any
reasonable stability comparison method shall satisfy. Section 4 defines TTC and states our
main result. Section 5 applies our main result to several natural comparison methods.
2 The Model
Let N denote an infinite set of potential students and C denote an infinite set of potential
schools.6 To specify a (school choice) problem, we first draw a finite set of students N ⊂ N
and a finite set of schools C ⊂ C.
A problem for (N,C) includes a preference profile R = (Ri)i∈N , a capacity profile
q = (qc)c∈C , and a priority profile = (c)c∈C . For each student i ∈ N , Ri denotes his
preference ordering over C ∪ {∅},7 where ∅ represents an outside option for the student.
The strict part of the preference ordering Ri is denoted by Pi, so if c1, c2 ∈ C ∪ {∅}, c1 6= c2,
and c1 Ri c2, then c1 Pi c2. School c is acceptable to student i if the student prefers it to the
outside option, that is, c Pi ∅. For each school c ∈ C, qc ∈ N denotes its capacity, which is
6We use the “potential students (schools)” terminology since we will be referring to sub-problems (problems
restricted to a set of students and schools given an original problem).
7Formally, a preference ordering over C ∪{∅} is a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relation
over C ∪ {∅}. Binary relation Ri over C ∪ {∅} is complete if, for every c1, c2 ∈ C ∪ {∅}, c1Ric2 or c2Ric1. It
is transitive if, for every c1, c2, c3 ∈ C ∪ {∅}, c1Ric2 and c2Ric3 imply c1Ric3. It is anti-symmetric if, for
every c1, c2 ∈ C ∪ {∅}, c1Ric2 and c2Ric1 imply c1 = c2.
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the maximum number of students that the school can admit, and c is a priority ordering
over the set of students N .8 The strict part of the priority ordering c is denoted by c. We
call the quintuple (N,C,R, q,) a problem. Let P(N,C) denote the set of all problems for
(N,C), and let P denote the set of all problems for any finite sets of students and schools.
Given a problem P = (N,C,R, q,) ∈ P , a set of students N ′ ⊆ N and schools C ′ ⊆ C,
we call P |(N\N ′,C\C′) as the restriction of P to (N\N ′, C\C ′), where P |(N\N ′,C\C′) is obtained
from P by simply removing N ′ and C ′, and also removing them from q, R, and  while
keeping relative orderings of the remaining students and the relative orderings and capacities
of the remaining schools the same.
Given a problem P = (N,C,R, q,) ∈ P, an assignment is a mapping µ : N ∪ C →
N ∪ C ∪ {∅} such that
(i) for each i ∈ N , µ(i) ∈ C ∪ {∅},
(ii) for each c ∈ C, µ(c) ⊆ N such that |µ(c)| ≤ qc, and
(iii) for each i ∈ N and each c ∈ C, i ∈ µ(c) if and only if c = µ(i).
Let A(P ) denote the set of all possible assignments at the problem P . Note that,
essentially, A(P ) is determined by (N,C, q).
For any set of students N ′ ⊆ N , we denote the aggregate assignment of N ′ at µ by
µ(N ′) = {c ∈ C|∃i ∈ N ′ : µ(i) = c}.9 We say that a set of students is isolated at µ if no
other student is assigned to a school in their aggregate assignment, i.e., N ′ is isolated at
µ if there is no i ∈ N \N ′ and c ∈ µ(N ′) such that µ(i) = c. Note that if N ′ is isolated at
µ, then N \N ′ is isolated as well. Note also that if µ is a one-to-one assignment (i.e., if no
school is assigned more than one student), then any set of students is isolated at µ.
Given an isolated set of students N ′ for µ with µ(N ′) = C ′, we denote by µ|N\N ′ the
restriction of µ to N\N ′ and C\C ′, where µ|N\N ′ is obtained from µ by simply removing
N ′ and C ′ while keeping the assignments of N\N ′ the same as in µ. Note that µ|N\N ′ ∈
A(P |(N\N ′,C\C′)) (as N ′ is isolated in µ and µ(N ′) = C ′).
An assignment µ is individually rational if for each i ∈ N , µ(i) Ri ∅. An assignment µ
Pareto dominates another assignment µ′ if for each i ∈ N , µ(i) Ri µ′(i) and there exists
i ∈ N such that µ(i) Pi µ′(i). An assignment µ is efficient if it is not Pareto dominated.10
8The priority ordering c is a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relation over N . Our
results extend to the more general setup where some students may be unacceptable for some schools.
9Note that µ(N ′) = ∅ if and only if all students in N ′ are assigned their outside options.
10Note that efficiency implies individual rationality.
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A pair (i, c) ∈ N × C blocks µ if c Pi µ(i) and [|µ(c)| < qc or there exists j ∈ µ(c) such
that i c j]. Let
B(µ) = {(i, c) ∈ N × C : (i, c) blocks µ}
denote the set of blocking pairs at µ. In addition, for each i ∈ N , let Bi(µ) = {c ∈ C : (i, c) ∈
B(µ)} denote the set of schools together with which student i constitute a blocking pair,
and for each c ∈ C, Bc(µ) = {i ∈ N : (i, c) ∈ B(µ)} denote the set of students together with
whom school c constitute a blocking pair.
An assignment µ is stable if it is individually rational and includes no blocking pair.
Unfortunately, there exist school choice problems without an assignment that is both efficient
and stable (Roth, 1982).
Given N ′ ⊆ N , we say that µ is N ′-stable if no student in N ′ is involved in a blocking
pair and also no school in µ(N ′) is involved in a blocking pair, i.e., for each i ∈ N ′, Bi(µ) = ∅
and for each c ∈ µ(N ′), Bc(µ) = ∅. We say that µ is N ′-unstable if µ is not N ′-stable.
A mechanism associates each problem with an assignment. When we say that a
mechanism satisfies a certain assignment property, such as efficiency, we mean that at each
problem, the assignment prescribed by the mechanism satisfies the property.
A mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof if reporting true preferences is a weakly dominant
strategy for each student in the preference revelation game induced by ϕ, that is, for each
problem (N,C,R, q,), each i ∈ N and each preference ordering R′i,
ϕi(N,C,R, q,) Ri ϕi(N,C, (R′i, R−i), q,).
When (N,C, q,) is clear, we often denote a problem simply by its preference profile R.
Now, using our convention, the above simply says ϕi(R) Ri ϕi(R
′
i, R−i).
3 A Unifying Approach to Stability Comparisons
Given a problem P ∈ P , a binary relation over assignments is a subset &⊆ A(P )×A(P ). We
use the convention and write µ & ν instead of (µ, ν) ∈&, and [µ  ν ⇔ µ & ν& not ν & µ].
Let L(P ) denote the set of all binary relations at P . Given &∈ L(P ), (i) & is complete if for
all µ, ν ∈ A(P ) we have µ & ν or ν & µ and (ii) & is transitive if µ & ν and ν & η imply
µ & η. Furthermore, given &,&′∈ L(P ) such that &⊆&′ we say that & is coarser than &′
and &′ is finer than &.
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A stability comparison is a function f associating with each problem P ∈ P a binary
relation f(P ) ∈ L(P ). Instead of f(P ), we write &Pf (where µ &Pf ν means that µ is f -more
stable than ν at P ). Note that, at this point, we do not impose any structure on a stability
comparison (such as neither completeness nor transitivity). Later we will describe several
examples of stability comparison methods. Also note that, when (N,C, q) is fixed, while
the set of assignments does not vary with the preference or the priority profile, the stability
comparison may vary with the preference and the priority profile, that is, stability comparisons
depend on the preference and the priority profile.
We introduce the following basic properties for a stability comparison f .
The first property stability preferred requires that any stable assignment is strictly f -more
stable than any unstable assignment. Formally, f satisfies stability-preferred if for each
P ∈ P and µ, ν ∈ A(P ), if B(µ) = ∅ 6= B(ν), then µ Pf ν.
The second property separability requires the following. Suppose that an assignment is
f -more stable than another assignment, and a set of students is isolated and have the same
aggregate assignment at both assignments. If this isolated set of students or their assigned
schools are not involved in any blocking pair at the first assignment while some of these
students are involved in a blocking pair at the second assignment, then the restriction of
the first assignment to the remaining students and schools is strictly f -more stable than the
restriction of the second assignment.
Formally, f satisfies separability if for each P ∈ P and µ, ν ∈ A(P ) such that ν &Pf µ,
if µ is N ′-stable for some nonempty isolated N ′ ⊆ N , N ′ is also isolated at ν and µ(N ′) =
ν(N ′) = C ′, and Bi(ν) 6= ∅ for some i ∈ N ′, then ν|N\N ′ P
′
f µ|N\N ′ , where P ′ = P |(N\N ′,C\C′).
The third property consistency requires the following. Suppose that two assignments
coincide for some subset of students which is isolated at both assignments. If these students
and their assigned schools are involved in blocking pairs only among themselves, then the
f -stability comparison remains unchanged when considering the assignments restricted to
the remaining students and schools.
Formally, f satisfies consistency if for each P ∈ P and µ, ν ∈ A(P ) such that ν &Pf µ,
if for some ∅ 6= N ′ ⊆ N that is isolated at both µ and ν, ν(i) = µ(i) for all i ∈ N ′,
Bi(µ) = Bi(ν) ⊆ µ(N ′) = ν(N ′) = C ′ for all i ∈ N ′, and Bc(µ) = Bc(ν) ⊆ N ′ for all
c ∈ µ(N ′), then ν|N\N ′ &P
′
f µ|N\N ′ , where P ′ = P |(N\N ′,C\C′).
Now given a stability comparison f and problem P , we say that µ is f-minimally
unstable at P among efficient assignments if there exists no efficient assignment ν such
that ν Pf µ.
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Given a mechanism ψ, we say that ψ is f-minimally unstable among efficient and
strategyproof mechanisms if for any efficient and strategyproof mechanism ϕ, [ϕ(P ) &Pf
ψ(P ) for all P ∈ P ] implies ϕ = ψ.
Given a mechanism ψ, we say that φ is weakly f-minimally unstable among efficient
and strategyproof mechanisms if there does not exist any efficient and strategyproof
mechanism ϕ with (i) ϕ(P ) &Pf ψ(P ) for all P ∈ P and (ii) ϕ(P ′) P
′
f ψ(P
′) for some P ′ ∈ P .
Note that the second definition is slightly different than the first one. Furthermore, if ψ
is f -minimally unstable among efficient and strategyproof mechanisms, then ψ is weakly f -
minimally unstable among efficiency and strategyproof mechanisms (but the converse does not
hold as there might exist a mechanism different from ψ with the identical f -stability measure).
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2019) and Kwon and Shorrer (2019) use the weaker second definition
and impose in addition comparability (among mechanisms) for their partial relations.
4 Robust Minimal Instability of Top Trading Cycles
The top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) is based
on Gale’s TTC algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) which runs, given a problem, as follows.
Top Trading Cycles (TTC) Algorithm:11
Step 1. Assign a counter for each school which keeps track of how many seats
are still available at the school. Initially set the counters equal to the capacities
of the schools. Each student points to her top-ranked school. Each school points
to the student who has the highest priority for the school. Since the number of
students and schools are finite, there is at least one cycle. (A cycle is an ordered
list of distinct students and distinct schools (k, ck)k∈{1,...,K} such that for each
k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, student k points to school ck and school ck points to student
k + 1 with the convention that K + 1 = 1. Moreover, each school can be part of
at most one cycle. Similarly, each student can be part of at most one cycle. Every
student in a cycle is assigned a seat at the school she points to and is removed.
The counter of each school in a cycle is reduced by one and if it reduces to zero,
the school is also removed. Counters of all other schools stay put.
Step t ≥ 2. Each remaining student points to her top-ranked school among the
remaining schools and each remaining school points to the student with highest
11Morrill (2015a), Morrill (2015b), and Hakimov and Kesten (2018) propose variants of TTC for the
many-o-one setup. For one-to-one problems, all variants coincide.
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priority among the remaining students. There is at least one cycle. Every student
in a cycle is assigned a seat at the school that she points to and is removed. The
counter of each school in a cycle is reduced by one and if it reduces to zero the
school is also removed. Counters of all other schools stay put.
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 1 Let f be a stability comparison satisfying stability preferred, separability and con-
sistency. Then TTC is f -minimally unstable among efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms
when each school has unit capacity.
The proof of Theorem 1 builds on the observation that if TTC is not f -minimally unstable
among efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms, then there must be a smallest number of
students, say n, such that there exists a mechanism ϕ that is defined on the domain of
problems including n students and strategy-proof, efficient, and f-more stable than TTC.
The heart of the proof contains two key steps: first, if some students who are assigned seats in
Step 1 of the TTC algorithm receive different schools at ϕ, then we construct a new domain
of problems including fewer students where TTC is not f -minimally unstable among efficient
and strategy-proof mechanisms; and otherwise, we construct a smaller problem (using our
basic properties of the stability comparison method) where the restricted TTC assignment is
more stable than the restricted ϕ assignment.
Proof. Suppose not. Let n be the smallest number of students such that there exists a
mechanism defined on the domain of problems with n students and a set of schools C that is
strategy-proof, efficient, and f -more stable than TTC. Note that n ≥ 3 since at any problem
including 1 or 2 students, the TTC assignment includes no blocking pair and f satisfies
stability preferred.
Suppose that ϕ is strategy-proof, efficient, and f -more stable than TTC on the domain of
problems with n students and a set of schools C.
Unless otherwise noted, all parameters of a problem except for the preference profile will
be fixed and we will denote a problem simply by its preference profile.
Lemma 1 Let P be an arbitrary problem including n students with the preference profile
R = (R1, . . . , Rn). Let i ∈ N be a student who is assigned a seat at Step 1 of TTC(R). Let
c ∈ C be the school that points to i at Step 1 of TTC(R). Let R′i be a preference relation for
student i at which c is the only acceptable school. Then, ϕi(R
′
i, R−i) = c.
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Proof. Suppose not, i.e., suppose that ϕi(R
′
i, R−i) 6= c (note that ϕi(R′i, R−i) = ∅).
By efficiency, there exists j1 6= i such that ϕj1(R′i, R−i) = c. Let R′j1 be a preference






, R−{i,j1}) = c.






, R−{i,j1}) ∈ N \ {i, j1}, i.e., c is assigned to a student different from i or










, R′j2 , R−{i,j1,j2}) = c.
Successive applications of the above argument imply that there exist {j1, . . . , jm} and a
preference profile R∗−{i,j1,j2,...,jm} for students N \ {i, j1, j2, . . . , jm} such that
• for each t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, R′jt is a preference relation for student jt at which c is the only
acceptable school,
• ϕjm(R′i, R′j1 , R
′
j2
, . . . , R′jm , R
∗
−{i,j1,j2,...,jm}) = c, and










−{i,j1,j2,...,jm}) ∈ {i, j1, . . . , jm}.
Let P ′ = (R′i, R
′
j1




−{i,j1,j2,...,jm}). Note that if m = n, then |B(TTC(P
′))| =
0 < |B(ϕ(P ′))| since i has the highest priority among all students at c. Moreover, this con-
tradicts that ϕ is f -more stable than TTC as f satisfies stability preferred and TTC(P ′) P ′f
ϕ(P ′). Thus, m < n.
Now, we will construct a mechanism ϕ′ defined on the domain of problems with students
N ′ = N \ {i, j1, j2, . . . , jm} and schools C ′ = C \ {c} that is strategy-proof, efficient, and
f-more stable than TTC, which will contradict that n is the smallest number of students
such a domain entails.
Let ϕ′ be defined as follows. For each preference profile RN ′ of N
′,









• If for each j ∈ N ′′ ⊆ N ′, Rj agrees with R∗j on the relative orderings of C ′, and for
each j′ ∈ N ′ \ N ′′, Rj does not agree with R∗j′ on the relative orderings of C ′, then









N ′)|N ′ where for each j ∈ N ′′, R′j = R∗j , and for
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each j ∈ N ′ \N ′′, R′j is a preference ordering which bottom-ranks c and agrees with
Rj′ on the relative orderings of C
′.
Note that ϕ′ is well-defined, in particular when {i, j1, . . . , jm} report (R′i, R′j1 , R
′
j2
, . . . , R′jm),
no student in N ′ can receive school c under any preference profile of N ′ (and {i, j1, . . . , jm}
is always isolated). To see that ϕ′ is strategy-proof, observe that manipulability of ϕ′ would
immediately imply the manipulability of ϕ. Efficiency of ϕ′ also follows directly from the
efficiency of ϕ. We will next show that ϕ′ is f -more stable than TTC.
Note that at any problem R (in the domain where there are n students) such that





, R′j2 , . . . , R
′
jm), no student in (i, j1, . . . , jm) is involved in a block-
ing pair at the TTC assignment; moreover, no student in N ′ is included in a blocking pair
together with c at the TTC assignment. Thus, TTC(R) is N\N ′-stable. On the other hand,
consider the problem P ′ = (R′i, R
′
j1




−{i,j1,j2,...,jm}). Note that (i, c) is a blocking




by efficiency of ϕ and construction, we have ∪h∈N\N ′{ϕh(P ′)} = {c} = ∪h∈N\N ′{TTCh(P ′)}
and N\N ′ is isolated under both ϕ(P ′) and TTC(P ′). Consequently, by separability of f ,
at the problem RN ′ (in the domain where there are n−m students) where for each j ∈ N ′,
Rj agrees with R
∗
j on the relative orderings of C





TTC(RN ′) (where the equalities follow from the definition of ϕ
′ and TTC).
Now consider any problem R (in the domain where there are n students) such that





, R′j2 , . . . , R
′
jm). Then for R, TTC(R) is N\N
′-stable. If for
some i ∈ N\N ′, ϕi(R) 6= ∅, then by efficiency ϕi(R) = c and we use the same arguments
as above (as N\N ′ is isolated under both TTC(R) and ϕ(R)). If TTCi(R) = ϕi(R) for
all i ∈ N\N ′, then by construction, ϕ(R′) is N\N ′-stable and N\N ′ is isolated under
both TTC(R) and ϕ(R). Hence, by consistency of f and ϕ(R) &Rf TTC(R), we obtain
ϕ(R)|N ′ &
RN′
f TTC(R)|N ′ . Thus (as R was arbitrary), for any profile RN ′ of N ′ we have
ϕ′(RN ′) &
RN′
f TTC(RN ′) (from the definition of ϕ
′ and TTC). Hence, ϕ′ is f -more stable
than TTC, contradicting that n is the smallest number of students such a domain entails.
Lemma 2 Let P be an arbitrary problem including n students with the preference profile
R = (R1, . . . , Rn). Let i ∈ N be a student who is assigned a seat at Step 1 of TTC(R). Then,
ϕi(R) = TTCi(R).
Proof. Let I1 denote the set of students who are assigned a seat at Step 1 of TTC(R) and
C1 denote the set of schools that are allocated at Step 1 of TTC(R). Note that if for each
i ∈ I1, ϕi(R) ∈ C1, then by efficiency, ϕi(R) = TTCi(R) for each i ∈ I1.
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Suppose that there exists i1 ∈ I1 such that ϕi1(R) /∈ C1. Let c1 ∈ C1 be the school that
points to i1 in Step 1 of TTC(R). Let R
′
i1
be a preference ordering for i1 at which TTCi1(R)
is top-ranked and c1 is second-ranked.
12 By strategy-proofness, ϕi1(R
′
i1
, R−i1) 6= TTCi1(R).
By Lemma 1 and strategy-proofness, ϕi1(R
′
i1
, R−i1) = c1.




and C1 is still the set of schools that are allocated at Step 1 of TTC(R
′
i1
, R−i1). Now, if for each








there exists i2 ∈ I1 \{i1} such that ϕi2(R) /∈ C1. Let c2 ∈ C1 be the school that points to i2 in
Step 1 of TTC(R). Let R′i2 be a preference ordering for i2 at which TTCi2(R) is top-ranked
and c2 is second-ranked. By strategy-proofness, ϕi2(R
′
i1
, R′i2 , R−{i1,i2}) 6= TTCi2(R). By
Lemma 1 and strategy-proofness, ϕi2(R
′
i1
, R′i2 , R−{i1,i2}) = c2.
Continuing in a similar fashion, we identify a list of students (i1, . . . , im) and a preference
profile R′ = (R′1, . . . , R
′
m) such that {i1, . . . , im} = I1, ϕi(R′) ∈ C1 for each i ∈ I1, and
ϕim(R
′) 6= TTCim(R′), which contradicts efficiency of ϕ.
Lemma 3 Let k be a number. Suppose that at any problem P including n students and
a preference profile R, if a student i is assigned a seat at an earlier step than Step k at
TTC(R), then ϕi(R) = TTCi(R). Let P be an arbitrary problem including n students with
the preference profile R = (R1, . . . , Rn). Let i ∈ N be a student who is assigned a seat at
Step k of TTC(R). Let c ∈ C be the school that points to i at Step k of TTC(R). Let
R′i be a preference relation for student i at which c is the only acceptable school. Then,
ϕi(R
′
i, R−i) = c.
Proof. The proof shares some arguments with the proof of Lemma 1. We repeat these
arguments for the sake of completeness.
Suppose not, i.e., suppose that ϕi(R
′
i, R−i) 6= c (note that ϕi(R′i, R−i) = ∅). By efficiency,
there exists j1 6= i such that ϕj1(R′i, R−i) = c. Let I<k denote the set of students who are
assigned seats at an earlier step than Step k at TTC(R). Note that any student j ∈ I<k is
still assigned the same seat at an earlier step than Step k at TTC(R′i, R−i). Then, by our
supposition, for any student j ∈ I<k, ϕj(R) = TTCj(R). But then, j1 /∈ I<k. Hence, by the
definition of TTC, i has higher priority than j1 at c since c points to i at Step k of TTC(R).






, R−{i,j1}) = c.
12We will use the convention and write sometimes for short R′i1 : TTCi1(R)c1.
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, RI<k , R−{i,j1,I<k}) = c. Let R
′
j2
be a preference relation for student j2 at which





, R′j2 , RI<k , R−{i,j1,j2,I<k}) = c.
Successive applications of the above argument imply that there exist {j1, . . . , jm} and a
preference profile R∗−{i,j1,j2,...,jm,I<k} for students N \ ({i, j1, j2, . . . , jm} ∪ I<k) such that
• for each t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, R′jt is a preference relation for student jt at which c is the only
acceptable school,
• ϕjm(R′i, R′j1 , R
′
j2
, . . . , R′jm , RI<k , R
∗
−{i,j1,j2,...,jm,I<k}) = c, and






, R′j2 , . . . , R
′
jm , RI<k , R
∗∗
−{i,j1,j2,...,jm,I<k}) /∈ N \ ({i, j1, j2, . . . , jm} ∪ I<k).
Let P ′ = (R′i, R
′
j1
, R′j2 , . . . , R
′
jm , RI<k , R
∗
−{i,j1,j2,...,jm,I<k}). First note that, each j ∈ I<k is
still assigned the same seat as in TTC(R) at an earlier step than Step k at TTC(P ′). Hence,
by our supposition, for any j ∈ I<k, ϕj(P ′) = TTCj(P ′) = TTCj(R). For later purposes, let
c = c1 and Jc1 = {i, j1, j2, . . . , jm}.
Now, note that if m = n−|I<k|, then N = Jc1∪I<k and TTCi(P ′) = ϕi(P ′) for all i ∈ I<k.
Hence, for all i ∈ I<k we have Bi(TTC(P ′)) = Bi(ϕ(P ′)) and for all c ∈ ∪h∈I<kTTCh(P ′),
Bc(TTC(P
′)) = Bc(ϕ(P
′)) ⊆ I<k. Thus, I<k is isolated under both ϕ(P ′) and TTC(P ′). But
then ϕ(P ′) &P
′
f TTC(P




′)|Jc1 . But this
is a contradiction to stability preferred of f as under P ′Jc1 we have B(TTC(P
′)|Jc1 ) = ∅ 6=
B(ϕ(P ′)|Jc1 ) since i has the highest priority among students Jc1 at c
1. This contradicts that
ϕ is f -more stable than TTC. Thus, m < n− |I<k|.
Next we show that for all i ∈ Ik\Jc1 we have TTCi(P ′) = ϕi(P ′). If ∪i∈IkTTCi(P ′) =
∪i∈Ikϕi(P ′), then this follows from efficiency of ϕ(P ′) and TTC(P ′). Thus, for some i ∈ Ik,
ϕi(P
′) /∈ ∪h∈Ik{TTCh(P ′)}. Thus, by construction of Jc1 and the induction hypothesis,
ϕi(P
′) /∈ {c} ∪ [∪h∈I≤k{TTCh(P ′)}] (where I≤k = I<k ∪ Ik). Let i = hl belong in TTC(P ′)
to a cycle c1 → h1 → · · · → cl → hl → cl+1 → hl+1 → · · · → c1 but ϕhl(R′) 6= cl+1, i.e.
TTChl(P
′) = cl+1, TTChl−1(P
′) = cl and cl points to hl in the TTC-algorithm. Let P̂hl : cl+1cl
and P̂ = (P̂hl , P
′
−hl). By strategyproofness and efficiency, ϕhl(P̂ ) = ∅ or ϕhl(P̂ ) = cl.
If ϕhl(P̂ ) = cl, then ϕhl−1(P̂ ) 6= cl. Then let P̂ ′hl−1 : clcl−1 and P̂
′ = (P̂ ′hl−1 , P̂−hl). By
strategyproofness and efficiency, ϕhl−1(P̂
′) = ∅ or ϕhl−1(P̂ ′) = cl−1. In the latter case, again
we have ϕhl−2(P̂
′) 6= cl−1, and so on until each agent hl receives cl and we find a contradiction
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to efficiency. Thus, at some point for ht ∈ Ik\Jc1 and Pht : ct+1ct we have for the constructed
profile R, ϕht(R) = ∅. Then let R′′ht : ct and R
′′ = (R′′ht , R−ht).
But then set c2 ≡ ct. Analogous successive applications of the above arguments show
that there exists Jc2 and a preference profile R
′′
Jc2
such that for all i ∈ Jc2 , R′′i : c2, and a
preference profile R∗−Jc1∪Jc2∪I<k for students N \ (Jc1 ∪ Jc2 ∪ I<k) such that
• for each i ∈ Jc2 , R′′i is a preference relation for student i at which c2 is the only
acceptable school,
• ϕh(R′Jc1 , R
′′
Jc2
, RI<k , R
∗
−Jc1∪Jc2∪I<k
) = c1 for some h ∈ Jc1 ,
• ϕh(R′Jc1 , R
′′
Jc2
, RI<k , R
∗
−Jc1∪Jc2∪I<k
) = c2 6= TTCh(R′Jc1 , R
′′
Jc2




some h ∈ Jc2 , and




, R′′Jc2 , RI<k , R
∗∗
−Jc1∪Jc2∪I<k
) /∈ N \ (Jc1 ∪ Jc2 ∪ I<k).
Let P ′′ = (R′Jc1 , R
′′
Jc2
, RI<k , R
∗
−Jc1∪Jc2∪I<k
). If for some profileR = (R′Jc1 , R
′′
Jc2




and some i ∈ Ik\(Jc1 ∪ Jc2) we have ϕi(R) 6= TTCi(R), then we do the same as above and




Otherwise we have for any profile R = (R′Jc1 , R
′′
Jc2
, RI<k , R
∗∗
−Jc1∪Jc2∪I<k
) and all i ∈ Ik\(Jc1∪
Jc2), ϕi(R) = TTCi(R).
Now consider P ′′ and Ik+1. If for some i ∈ Ik+1\(Jc1 ∪ Jc2), ϕi(R) 6= TTCi(R), then we
find as above c3 and Jc3 , and so on.
Thus, we find {c1, . . . , cq} and mutually disjunct sets Jc1 , . . . , Jcq and I<k such that for
P (q) = (R′Jc1 , R
′′
Jc2
, . . . , R
(q)
Jcq




• for each i ∈ Jcp (with p ∈ {1, . . . , q}), R(p)i is a preference relation for student i at which
cp is the only acceptable school,
• for each p ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1}, ϕh(P (p)) = cp for some h ∈ Jcp ,
• ϕh(P (q)) = cq 6= TTCh(P (q)) for some h ∈ Jcq , and
• ϕi(P (q)) = TTCi(P (q)) for all i ∈ N\(Jc1 ∪ · · · ∪ Jcq).
Let µ = ϕ(P (q)) and ν = TTC(P (q)). Because ϕ is f -more stable than TTC, we have
µ &P
(q)
f ν. Now we will successively remove in the order Jc1 , . . . , Jcq .
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If µ(i) = ν(i) for all i ∈ Jc1 , then we have Bi(µ) = Bi(ν) = ∅ for all i ∈ Jc1 and
Bc1(µ) = ∅ = Bc1(ν). Thus, by the fact that Jc1 is isolated under both µ and ν and





f ν|N\Jc1 . Otherwise, Bi(ν) = ∅ for all i ∈ Jc1 and
Bc1(ν) = ∅ but for some j ∈ Jc1 , Bj(µ) 6= ∅. Furthermore, µ(Jc1) = {c1} = ν(Jc1) and Jc1 is




















f ν|N\(Jc1∪Jc2 ), and so on







f ν|N\(Jc1∪···∪Jcq−1 ). Note that by construc-
tion under PN\(Jc1∪···∪Jcq−1 ), for Jcq we have Bi(ν|N\(Jc1∪···∪Jcq−1 )) = ∅ for all i ∈ Jcq and
Bcq(ν|N\(Jc1∪···∪Jcq−1 )) = ∅ but for some j ∈ Jcq , Bj(µ|N\(Jc1∪···∪Jcq−1 )) 6= ∅. Furthermore,
µ(Jcq) = {cq} = ν(Jcq) and Jcq is isolated under both µ and ν (and their restrictions). But








This is a contradiction as for all i ∈ N\(Jc1 ∪ · · · ∪ Jcq), µ(i) = ν(i).13
Concluding the proof: We show, by induction, that ϕ and TTC coincide on the
domain of problems with n students, which contradicts that ϕ is more stable than TTC, and
concludes the proof.
Base case: For any problem with preference profile R including n students, for each
student i who is assigned a seat at Step 1 of the TTC algorithm, ϕi(R) = TTCi(R). This
follows from Lemma 2.
Inductive step: Assume that for any problem with preference profile R including n
students, for each student i who is assigned a seat at an earlier step than Step k of the TTC
algorithm, ϕi(R) = TTCi(R). We will show that for each student j who is assigned a seat at
Step k of the TTC algorithm, ϕj(R) = TTCj(R).
Let Ik denote the set of students who are assigned a seat at Step k of TTC(R) and Ck
denote the set of schools that are allocated at Step k of TTC(R). Note that if for each i ∈ Ik,
ϕk(R) ∈ Ck, then by efficiency, ϕi(R) = TTCi(R) for each i ∈ Ik.
Suppose that there exists i1 ∈ Ik such that ϕi1(R) /∈ Ck. Let c1 ∈ Ck be the school that
points to i1 in Step k of TTC(R). Let R
′
i1
be a preference ordering for i1 at which TTCi1(R)
13Note that k > 1 and I<k 6= ∅.
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is top-ranked and c1 is second-ranked. By strategy-proofness, ϕi1(R
′
i1
, R−i1) 6= TTCi1(R). By
Lemma 3 and strategy-proofness, ϕi1(R
′
i1
, R−i1) = c1.




and Ck is still the set of schools that are allocated at Step k of TTC(R
′
i1
, R−i1). Now, if for each








there exists i2 ∈ Ik \{i1} such that ϕi2(R) /∈ Ck. Let c2 ∈ Ck be the school that points to i2 in
Step k of TTC(R). Let R′i2 be a preference ordering for i2 at which TTCi2(R) is top-ranked
and c2 is second-ranked. By strategy-proofness, ϕi2(R
′
i1
, R′i2 , R−{i1,i2}) 6= TTCi2(R). By
Lemma 3 and strategy-proofness, ϕi2(R
′
i1
, R′i2 , R−{i1,i2}) = c2.
Continuing in a similar fashion, we identify a list of students (i1, . . . , im) and a preference
profile R′ = (R′1, . . . , R
′
m) such that {i1, . . . , im} = Ik, ϕi(R′) ∈ Ck for each i ∈ Ik, and
ϕim(R
′) 6= TTCim(R′), which contradicts efficiency of ϕ.
Remark 1 When schools may have multiple available seats, there exists a strategy-proof
and efficient mechanism ϕ such that there exists a problem where the ϕ assignment is stable
while the TTC assignment is unstable, and at any other problem where the ϕ assignment
is different from the TTC assignment, the ϕ assignment is stable (Abdulkadiroğlu et al.,
2019). Therefore, as long as the stability measure f satisfies stability preferred, TTC is not
f -minimally unstable among efficient and strategyproof mechanisms when schools may have
multiple seats.
5 Applications
Below, we apply our main result to different natural stability comparison methods. Some
of them are inclusion methods whereas others are the (corresponding) cardinal methods.
Furthermore, it is easy to verify that any of the comparison methods below satisfies stability
preferred, separability and consistency, and hence, Theorem 1 holds.
This shows the robust minimal instability of TTC among efficient and stretegy-proof
mechanisms (with unit capacities).
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5.1 Blocking Pairs
The blocking pairs inclusion comparison (pincl) is defined as follows. For each problem P ∈ P
and µ, ν ∈ A(P ),
µ &Ppincl ν ⇔ B(µ) ⊆ B(ν).
Among others, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2019) and Tang and Zhang (2017) study this stability
comparison.
Corollary 1 [Theorem 1 of Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, Pathak, Roth and Tercieux, 2019] TTC
is weakly pincl-minimally unstable among efficient and strategyproof mechanisms when each
school has unit capacity.
The blocking pairs cardinality comparison (pcard) is defined as follows. For each problem
P ∈ P and µ, ν ∈ A(P ),
µ &Ppcard ν ⇔ |B(µ)| ≤ |B(ν)|.
Note that &Ppincl⊆&Ppcard.14
Corollary 2 TTC is pcard-minimally unstable among efficient and strategyproof mechanisms
when each school has unit capacity.
Obviously, for any problem P : (i) &Ppincl⊆&Ppcard, (ii) &Ppincl is transitive but not complete,
and (iii) &Ppcard is complete (as any two assignments can be compared) and transitive. Hence,
Corollary 2 implies Corollary 1.
5.2 Blocking Triplets
The blocking triplets inclusion comparison (tincl) is defined as follows. Let (i, j, c) ∈ T (µ) if
and only if i c j, µ(j) = c, and cPiµ(i). For each P ∈ P and µ, ν ∈ A(P ),
µ &Ptincl ν ⇔ T (µ) ⊆ T (ν).
Kwon and Shorrer (2019) study this stability comparison.
Corollary 3 [Proposition 7 of Kwon and Shorrer, 2019] TTC is weakly tincl-minimally
unstable among efficient and strategyproof mechanisms when each school has unit capacity.
14Doğan and Ehlers (2020) study this stability comparison method for efficient assignments.
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The blocking triplets cardinality comparison tcard is defined as follows. For each P ∈ P
and µ, ν ∈ A(P ),
µ &Ptcard ν ⇔ |T (µ)| ≤ |T (ν)|.
Note that &Ptincl⊆&Ptcard.
Corollary 4 TTC is tcard-minimally unstable among efficient and strategyproof mechanisms
when each school has unit capacity.
Obviously, for any problem P : (i) &Ptincl⊆&Ptcard, (ii) &Ptincl is transitive but not complete,
and (iii) &Ptcard is complete and transitive. Hence, Corollary 4 implies Corollary 3.
5.3 Blocking Students
The blocking students inclusion comparison (sincl) is defined as follows. Let BS(µ) = {i ∈
N : Bi(µ) 6= ∅}. For each problem P ∈ P and µ, ν ∈ A(P ),
µ &Psincl ν ⇔ BS(µ) ⊆ BS(ν).
Corollary 5 TTC is sincl-minimally unstable among efficient and strategyproof mechanisms
when each school has unit capacity.
The blocking students cardinality comparison (scard) is defined as follows. For each
P ∈ P and µ, ν ∈ A(P ),
µ &Pscard ν ⇔ |BS(µ)| ≤ |BS(ν)|.
Corollary 6 TTC is scard-minimally unstable among efficient and strategyproof mechanisms
when each school has unit capacity.
Obviously, (i) &Psincl⊆&Pscard, (ii) &Psincl is transitive but not complete and (iii) &Pscard is
complete and transitive.15
6 Appendix
The examples below show that the three properties, stability preferred, separability, and
consistency, are independent for stability comparison methods.
15Doğan and Ehlers (2020) also study the stability comparison methods based on blocking students.
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Example 1 (Only stability preferred violated) Consider the following stability com-
parison &= ∅, that is, for any problem P and any µ, ν ∈ A(P ), µ and ν are incomparable in
terms of &P , i.e &P= ∅. Note that separability and consistency are vacuously satisfied, while
stability preferred is clearly violated.
Example 2 (Only separability violated) Consider the following stability comparison &.
For any P ∈ P and µ, ν ∈ A(P ), let µ &Pf ν if and only if B(ν) is not a proper subset of
B(µ), i.e., B(ν) 6( B(µ). Note that µ Pf ν if and only if B(µ) ( B(ν).
Clearly, stability preferred is satisfied. To see that consistency is satisfied, take any µ and ν
such that ν &P µ and for some ∅ 6= N ′ ⊆ N , ν(i) = µ(i) for all i ∈ N ′, Bi(µ) = Bi(ν) ⊆ µ(N ′)
for all i ∈ N ′, and Bc(µ) = Bc(ν) ⊆ N ′ for all c ∈ µ(N ′) = ν(N ′) = C ′ and N ′ is isolated
under both µ and ν. But then, B(µ|N\N ′) 6( B(ν|N\N ′) and therefore ν|N\N ′ &
PN\N′
f µ|N\N ′.
To see that separability is violated, consider the following problem P where N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
and C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}. Only the relevant top parts of the preference and priority profiles are
depicted.
R1 R2 R3 R4 c1 c2 c3 c4
c2 c3 c3 c4 1 3 2 3





1 2 3 4




1 2 3 4
c1 c2 c3 c4
)
where B(µ) = {(3, c4)} and B(ν) = {(1, c2), (2, c3)}. Let N ′ = {1}. Note that ν &Pf µ, µN ′
is N ′-stable, µ(N ′) = ν(N ′), and B1(ν) 6= ∅ where 1 ∈ N ′. Moreover, µ|N\N ′ &
PN\N′
f ν|N\N ′,
implying that separability is violated.
Example 3 (Only consistency violated) Consider the following stability comparison &.
For any problem P ∈ P and µ, ν ∈ A(P ), let µ &Pf ν if and only if B(µ) = ∅ or (|B(ν)| ≥ 2
and |B(µ)| ≤ |B(ν)|). Note that µ Pf ν if and only if B(µ) = ∅ 6= B(ν) or (|B(ν)| ≥ 2 and
B(µ) < |B(ν)|). Also note that when |B(µ)| = |B(ν)| = 1, µ and ν are incomparable in
terms of &P .
By definition, stability preferred is satisfied. To see that separability is satisfied, take
any µ and ν such that ν &Pf µ, and take any ∅ 6= N ′ ⊆ N such that µ is N ′-stable,
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µ(N ′) = ν(N ′) = C ′ and Bi(ν) 6= ∅ for some i ∈ N ′. Note that |B(µ|N\N ′)| ≥ 2 and
|B(ν|N\N ′)| < |B(µ|N\N ′)|. Hence, ν|N\N ′ 
PN\N′
f µ|N\N ′.
To see that consistency is violated, consider the following problem P where N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
and C = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}. Only the relevant top parts of the preference and priority profiles
are depicted.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
c2 c2 c4 c4 c5 1 1 3 3 4





1 2 3 4 5




1 2 3 4 5
c1 c2 c4 c3 c5
)
where B(µ) = {(1, c2), (3, c1)} and B(ν) = {(1, c2), (4, c5)}. Let N ′ = {1, 2}.
Note that ν &Pf µ, ν(i) = µ(i) for all i ∈ N ′, Bi(µ) = Bi(ν) ⊆ µ(N ′) for all i ∈ N ′,
and Bc(µ) = Bc(ν) ⊆ N ′ for all c ∈ µ(N ′) = ν(N ′) = C ′. Yet, ν|N\N ′ and µ|N\N ′ are
incomparable, implying that consistency is violated.
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